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FINANCING CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES
Dale A. Whitman*

I.

CONDOMINIUMS

AND COOPERATIVES-AN

OVERVIEW

This article will deal with legal problems relating to the financing
of condominiums and cooperatives. While space does not permit a detailed treatment of the non-financing aspects of these forms of ownership, a rudimentary overview of the legal relationships involved will
preface discussion of the central topic.'
Both condominiums and cooperatives are legal formats for "unit
ownership"--that is, the ownership of a physically defined portion of
a larger parcel of (usually improved) real property. In the majority
of cases, the "unit" is a residential apartment in a multifamily housing
project. Condominiums are much more tightly controlled by state legislation than are cooperatives, and in recent years many states have
®
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1. The most complete and useful treatment of such non-financing areas is P.
ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW & PRACTICE (1976).
Other works include
D. CLURMAN & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND CooPERATIvEs (1969); A. FmUR
& K. STECHER, LAW OF CONDOMINIUM (1967); P. RoHAN & M. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE
HousINo LAW AND PRACTICE (1975); and K. ROMNEY, CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT

GumE (1974).

An excellent current summary is found in Symposium on the Law

of Condominiums, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 677 (1974).
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amended their condominium statutes to permit the creation of condominiums in non-residential property, including commercial and industrial buildings, and even on unimproved land.2 There are no significant legal barriers to non-residential cooperative ownership, although
it is quite rare.
In most cases the owner of a condominium or cooperative unit is
also a participant in some organization of owners which has responsibility for the operation, maintenance, and management of the "common
areas"-features of the building or project which are used or available
for use by all unit owners, such as lobbies, stairwells, elevators, grounds
and landscaping, and often recreational facilities. The principal distinctions between condominiums and cooperatives are discussed below.
The Condominium

The term "condominium" is variously used to refer to the underlying concept, the building, or the individual unit; in this article, it refers to the building. In a condominium, each owner holds fee simple
title to his unit directly. In addition, he and his fellow unit owners
each own undivided fractional shares in the common areas of the project as tenants in common. Management and maintenance of these
common facilities are performed by an owners' association, which may
be incorporated or unincorporated. 3 The fractional shares in the common areas and the vote of each member of the association are assigned
on some equitable basis, such as the number of square feet in the unit
or its proportionate cost of the original construction.4 The association
2. The model act on which many early American statutes were based used the
term "apartment", presumably implying residential use; see FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, MODEL STATUTE FOR THE CREATION OF APARTMENT OWNERSHIP

§ 2(a),
reprinted in G. NELSON & D. WhrrmAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

781 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FHA MODEL AcT]. Examples of much broader
,definitions which permit non-residential uses include ALASKA STAT. § 34.07.450(1)
(1962); ORLA. STAT. tit.60, § 503(b) (Supp. 1976); VA. CODE § 55-79.2(a) (1950).
See P. RoHAN & M. RESKIn,

CoNDOMIN uM LAW AND PRACncE § 5.01[2] (1976).

On non-residential condominiums, see generally D. CLURMAN, THE BUSINESS CONDOMINIUM (1973); Goldstein, Lipson, Rohan & Shapiro, Commercial and industrial Con-

dominiums: An Overall Analysis, 48 ST. JOHN's L. Rnv. 817 (1974); Shapiro, Commercial Condominiums: Significant Tax Benefits Possible If Properly Structured, 41 J.

TAXATION 46 (1974); Shapiro, Commercial Condominiums: Tax Considerations For
Unit Purchasers And The Association, 41 J. TAXATION 204 (1974).
3. The present trend seems to be incorporation of associations. See Hyatt, Condominium and Home Owner Associations: Formation and Development, 24 Emory
L.J. 977 (1975); Jackson, Why You Should Incorporate a Homeowners Association,

3 REAL EST. L.J. 311 (1975); Krasnowiecki, Townhouses with Homes Association:
A New Perspective, 123 U. PA. L REv. 711 (1975).
4. See Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U.

CHI. L. REv.253 (1976).
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may assert a lien on each unit to enforce the owner's obligation to pay
his share of the assessments levied by the association for management,
maintenance, insurance, reserves for replacements, and the like.5
There is little question that a form of unit ownership similar to
the condominium concept can be developed by careful structuring of
documents in the absence of an authorizing statute. This has been
done in many countries and continues today in England. 6 However,
every jurisdiction in the United States has enacted a condominium statute which attempts to regularize procedures, spell out the duties and
obligations of the unit owners and the association, provide for such
eventualities as damage, destruction, and condemnation of the condominium, and provide legal confirmation of the association's lien rights
against delinquent unit owners. The statutes also provide for separate
property tax assessment on each unit and prohibit partitioning of the
common areas. Most American statutes were enacted during the
1960-1970 period, and were based heavily on model legislation drafted
by the Federal Housing Administration.7 The statutes were helpful in
standardizing relationships and protecting unit owners from some forms
of overreaching, but they were unnecessarily restrictive in many respects and a "second generation" of statutes, which generally provide
far greater flexibility in the legal structuring of the development, as
well as more extensive consumer protection, has begun to be enacted.'
The Cooperative
In a cooperative the entire project, including the individual units
and the common areas, is owned by a single corporation (often organized as a not-for-profit) 8 . Persons who purchase units in the coopera5. See Jackson, Homeowners Associations: Remedies to Enforce Assessment Collections, 51 LA.B.J. 423 (1976); Anthony v. Brea Glenbrook Club, 58 Cal. App.
3d 506, 130 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1976) (planned unit development).
6. See 1 P. RoHIAN & M. REsKIN, CoNDOMmIUM LAW AND P CTICE, ch. 4 (1976);
Leyser, The Ownership of Flats--A Comparative Study, 7 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 31

(1958).
7. See note 2 supra.
8. Leaders in this movement include FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.101-.508 (Supp.
1977), discussed in Comment, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 387 (1975) and 27 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 451 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-8-1 through 57-8-36 .(1953 & Supp.
1977); VA. CODE §§ 55-79.39-.103 (Supp. 1977), discussed in Comment, 9 U. RMCHMoND
L. REV. 135 (1974) and Johnakin, A Second Generation of Condominium Statutes,
LxWYERS TrrLE NEws, May-June 1974, at 3. See generally Cannella, Recent Innovations in State Condominium Legislation, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 994 (1974).
9. Although corporate ownership of cooperatives is by far the most common format, trust or tenancy-in-common ownership are also possible and have been used occa-
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*tive receive, as evidence of their interests, two documents: a "proprietary lease", indicating the member's right of possession in the particular apartment, and a stock certificate, evidencing ownership of a
share or shares in the corporation. The documents usually provide that

ownership of the stock and the tenant's interest in the proprietary lease
are inseparable.
In most cooperatives, each apartment owner has a single vote,

rather than a vote apportioned by value or size as with condominiums.
The functions of the corporation are similar to those of the owners' as-

sociation in a condominium, but are more extensive. Since the cooperative corporation owns the project, it will normally be the mortgagor
on one or more blanket mortgages covering the building. The "rent"
paid by tenants under their proprietary leases must be sufficient to
cover the cost of servicing this debt and the property taxes on the pro-

ject in addition to such management, maintenance, and other expenses
and reserves as would be expected in a condominium.

Both condo-

minium'0

and cooperative unit owners are entitled to deduct the portion
of their monthly payments attributable to mortgage interest and real
estate taxes, although this privilege is available to cooperative members
only if at least 80% of the gross income of the corporation is derived
from payments by tenant-stockholders."
sionally.

P. RoHAN & M. RESKcN, COOPERATrVE HousiNo LAW AND PRACrIca § 201

(1975). LR.C. § 216(b)(1)(c), which permits deduction of mortgage interest and
property taxes by cooperative owners, is satisfied only if "no stockholder . . . is entitled
to receive any distribution not out of earnings and profits of the corporation except
on a complete or partial liquidation of the corporation." See the description of Co-op
City by the Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 840
(1975).
10. Rev. Rul. 64-31, 1964-1 C.B. 300.
11. See LR.C. § 216, which imposes numerous other requirements on co-ops in
addition to the 80% test. The treatment of the portion of a co-op member's monthly
lpayment which is attributable to amortization on the blanket mortgage raises difficult
tax problems. Often the co-op and its members will agree that this amount is to
be treated as additional contribution to capital, and hence not income to the corporatign; this is attractive, since the corporation is a taxable entity, and may otherwise
owe federal tax on its income. This aliproach has been successful in avoiding tax
at the corporate level in several cases; see, e.g., Lake Forest, Inc. v. Commissioner,
22 T.C.M. 156 (CCH) (1963). However, the members may also wish to assert that
the amortization compone'nt of each monthly payment is income for purposes of the
80% rule, thus maximizing the amount of income the co-op can receive from outside
sources (e.g., commercial rental space, vending and laundry machines) while still qualifying under § 216. The Court of Claims has held that the co-op and its members
can agree to either capital or income treatment of the amortization payments but cannot
have it both ways; see Eckstein v. U.S., "452 F.2d 1036 (Ct. Cl. 1971). See Miller,
Tax Problems of the Housing Cooperative under the 80% Income Rule, 18 PRAc.
LAw. 81 (No. 4, Apr. 1972), which also discusses the other requirements which §
216 imposes on the legal structure of co-ops.
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For federal tax purposes a cooperative member is treated much
like the owner of a condominium or a detached house, assuming the
A radically different approach was used by the Tax Court in Park Place, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 767 (1972), which held that mortgage amortization, property
tax, maintenance, and apparently mortgage interest components of payments made by
co-op members to the corporation are not taxable income to it-and that the corporation has no offsetting deduction when it pays out these items-despite the fact that
the same items are income for purposes of the 80% rule of § 216. The Tax Court
thus gave the members the best of both worlds; whether this view will prevail over
Eckstein remains to be seen.
This issue may become somewhat less important as a result of an amendment
to I.R.C. § 216(c), made by § 2101(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which expressly authorizes cooperatives to claim depreciation deductions on their real estate;
the Tax Court had rejected such a claim in Park Place. Apparently this deduction
is available even if individual tenant-shareholders are also claiming depreciation on
their own units because they are being used in a trade or business or for the production
of income. At least in the early years of ownership of new buildings, depreciation
will usually more than offset mortgage amortization, thus minimizing or eliminating
taxable income even if the amortization payments are regarded as income. For older
and long-held buildings, the conflict between Eckstein and Park Place will still require
resolution.
Condominiums have no 80% test to meet, and they normally make no assessments
upon members for mortgage interest or amortization. However, both cooperatives and
condominium associations may collect general operating reserves or reserves for future
replacements or improvements in amounts exceeding the offsetting deductions of the
current year's expenditures. Several theories have been developed (and accepted by
the Commissioner) under which these reserves may escape taxation at the association
or corporate level; one such theory is that, if earmarked specifically for replacements
or improvements rather than general operations or repairs, they are contributions to
capital; another is that the association is merely an agent of the members in holding
these funds until they need to be expended. See Concord Village, Inc. v. Commissioner,
65 T.C. 142 (1975); Rev. Rul. 75-370, 1975-2 C.B. 25; Rev. Rul. 75-371, 1975-2
C.B. 52; Frank, IRS Takes Harsh Position on Exempting Condominium and Homeowners' Associations, 44 J. TAxATiom 306 (1976).
It may also be possible for a condominium or cooperative corporation to qualify
for tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) as a "civic league." However, in
Rev. Rul. 74-99, 1974-1 C.B. 131, the Commissioner seems to have limited application
of § 501(c)(4) to associations which (1) bear a reasonably recognizable relationship
to an area recognizable as a governmental subdivision or a district thereof; (2) perform
no exterior maintenance on privately-owned residences; and (3) own and maintain
only facilities which are used and enjoyed by the general public, such as streets and
parks. Obviously, many associations far exceed these limited activities, and hence will
not be deemed tax-exempt.
I.R.C. § 528, added by § 2101 of the TAx REFORM Acr of 1976, allows homeowners associations in condominiums and planned unit developments to elect a limited
form of tax-exempt status. Cooperatives are not eligible for this election, and a variety
of limiting criteria must be met. Moreover, if the election is made, only "exempt
function income", defined as membership dues, fees, and assessments, is exempt. Income from use charges for facilities, such as swimming pools, and from other sources
is taxable, and the corporate surtax exemption is denied to electing associations. Thus
the election could be quite disadvantageous in some cases, and non-electing associations
will presumably be relegated to the pre-1976 arguments discussed above if they wish
to shelter their excess income from taxation. See Cowan, Working With New Rules
for Condominiums, Cooperatives, and Homeowners Associations, 46 J. TAxAToN 204
(1977).
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requirements of I.R.C. section 216 are met. But for many other purposes the question remains: Is the cooperator's interest real or personal
property? Since the cooperative is a unique kind of hybrid, answers
to this question vary, depending on the view the courts take of the
underlying policies. The characterization of the interest may be relevant for a wide variety of reasons, including the doctrine of restraints
on alienation, rent control, ad valorem taxes, transfer taxes, conveyancing doctrines, construction of wills and of intestacy and judgment lien
statutes, availability of title insurance, institutional financing,12 summary eviction proceedings to members, and determination of the
proper procedures for registering or recording transfers and creations
of security interests, whether under the Uniform Commercial Code or
realty recording acts. The answers of the courts in these contexts are
far from uniform,' 3 although there is no reason why the interest of a
cooperative member should not be treated on a par with a condominium unit owner-as the owner of real propety-for most purposes.
It is apparent that each member of a cooperative is somewhat
more reliant upon the financial strength and honesty of his or her fellow
members than is a condominium unit owner. If many members of a
cooperative default, it may be impossible to meet the regular debt service payments on the blanket mortgage, which may consequently be
foreclosed. In a condominium, by contrast, each unit owner arranges
his own permanent financing on his apartment, and defaults by one's
neighbors in the payment of monthly assessments, while possibly endangering the solvency of the owners' association, cannot directly trigger foreclosure by a lender of the unit belonging to a non-delinquent
owner. On the other hand, it is probably easier for the member's
organization to evict a delinquent owner and to realize on the security
of his14unit for unpaid assessments in a cooperative than in a condominium.

12. Whether cooperative financing involves real or personal property under the
rules of financial regulatory agencies, and the procedures for perfecting liens on cooperative members' interests, are discussed in the text accompanying notes 111 through 118.
13. See Comment, Legal Characterizationof the Individual's Interest in a Cooperative Apartment: Realty or Personalty, 73 CoLum. L. REv. 250 (1973); P. ROHAN &
M. REsKiN, COOPERATIVE HousINo LAw AND PRACTCE, § 2.01[5] (1975).
14. The cooperative can treat the delinquent member as a tenant and use unlawful
detainer or other summary process to evict him; Sun Terrace Manor v. Municipal
Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 739, 108 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1973); Green v. Greenbelt Homes,
Inc., 232 Md. 496, 194 A.2d 273 (1963). See Rohan, Cooperative Housing: An
Appraisal of Residential Controls and Enforcement Procedures, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1323
(1966), questioning whether such a severe remedy should be available for minor defaults or violations of the co-op's rules. In a condominium, by contrast, the usual
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Condominiums and cooperatives share many of the same econo-

mic and social advantages: economies of scale in the initial cost and
maintenance of recreation, parking, and other community facilities, the
potential for competent management of the common areas, and the advantages of security and social contact which result from relatively highdensity occupancy, as well as the concomitant problems.13 Since the

advent of condominium statutes in most American jurisdictions, lending
institutions and developers (and consequently consumers) have tended

to prefer condominiums in most jurisdictions, and relatively few new
cooperatives are being built.
II.

FINANCING CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES

Condominium and cooperative financing differ from one another
in important respects. A condominium project is much like a subdivision of detached houses; financing of construction is usually independent
of the permanent or long-term financing of the sales of individual

units. 16 The construction loan is typically secured by a blanket mortgage on the entire property, with provision for the release of each in-

dividual unit from that mortgage as the units are sold by the developer
to customers; the "partial release clause" in the construction mortgage
will spell out the circumstances under which units will be released and
the amount which must be applied toward retirement of the construc-

tion indebtedness for each unit sold. 17

The permanent mortgages

remedy is foreclosure of the association's lien on the unit, an action which normally
enjoys no calendar preference and may take many months to complete. In either
case, of course, the association must follow its own rules and bylaws, and may also
be subject to local statutes or ordinances; see Clydesdale, Inc. v. Wegener, 372 A.2d
1013 (D.C. 1977).
15. See Comment, Community Living Condominium Style: Bed of Roses-Or Bed
of Thorns?, 6 UNrv. W.L.A.L. Rnv. 121 (1974).
16. See Pfeiler, Condominium Financing: Some Legal Basics, 38 U.S. LBAGUE oF
SAvING A. LEGAL BuLL. 249, 255-62 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Pfeiler]. Like most
subdivision lenders, the condominium construction lender will usually require that a
"take-out" or permanent loan commitment be obtained from another lender (or the
permanent loan department of the same institution) before approving the construction
loan. See Fegan, Condominium Financing, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 799 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fegan].
17. A common provision requires "pre-sales" (executed contracts of sale to customers) on somez fixed percentage of the units (say, 35% to 75%) before the construction
lender will release the lien on any of the units. See Vishny, Financing the Condominium, 1970 ITL. L.F. 181 (1970). Similarly, the permanent lender may refuse to
disburse funds until a specified percentage of the units have been presold; Fegan, supra
note 16. The Federal Housing Administration generally requires that 80% (in value)
of the units be presold before unit titles can be transferred and FHA mortgage insurance issued; see 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(c) (3) (1977).
In imposing such requirements, lenders are concerned that they not be committed
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placed on individual units by their purchasers are usually arranged by
the developer through a single lender, which may or may not be the
mortgagee on the construction loan."" In theory unit purchasers can
obtain long-term loans from institutions which have had no prior contact with the project, but this is much more difficult than in subdivisions
of detached houses; many lenders will be reluctant to undertake an extensive review of the documents which relate to a condominium if they
expect to make only one or a few loans on units in that project.' 9
Cooperatives are also financed with construction mortgages, but
there are generally no individual loans to those who purchase the units
when construction is completed. 20 Instead, the construction loan may
simply be converted to a permanent loan by the mortgagee-which
means that it will begin to draw regular (usually monthly) payments of
amortization and interest. At that point the construction loan may also
be sold by the original mortgagee to another investor, particularly if the
construction lender is a type of institution that prefers to avoid longterm mortgages. Alternatively, the cooperative corporation may obtain
a new- blanket loan from a permanent lender and use the proceeds to
discharge the construction loan. In either event, the permanent mortgage on a cooperative project is a blanket mortgage covering the entire
property. Unit purchasers make down payments equal to the difference
between the unit's market sales value and its pro-rata share of the blanket
mortgage; in effect, they assume their shares of the mortgage.
The subsequent resale of an individual unit by one occupant to
another also involves different treatment in condominiums than in coto financing the project as a condominium until they have substantial evidence of
consumer demand; if the demand does not materialize, they may insist that the building
be converted to rental use.
18. As an alternative to financing unit sales with new permanent mortgages, it
is theoretically possible for the construction lender to take a separate mortgage on
each unit, and to convert those mortgages to permanent status by loan assumptions
as the units are sold to customers. This procedure is fairly common in some areas
of the nation with subdivision development, but is not widely used with condominiums.
It arguably violates § 14 of the FHA MODEL Aci, supra note 2, which provides:
"At the time of the first conveyance of each apartment, every mortgage and other
lien affecting such apartment. . . shall be paid and satisfied of record . . . ." There
is no policy reason to prohibit assumptions of construction loans by unit purchasers,
and the Model Act should not be so construed.
19. Such loans are sometimes termed "spot mortgages", and many lenders avoid
them; their reluctance makes it extremely difficult for the original permanent lender
to diversify its portfolio by declining to make resale financing available as the units
turn over later. See Gose, Strum & Zinmah, Real Estate Financing Techniques: What
Now?, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUsT J. 617, 634 (1974).
20. Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUm. L. REv.
987 (1963).
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operatives. In a condominium unit sale the existing mortgage may be
assumed, taken subject to, or paid off by the unit purchaser with the

proceeds of a new loan he has arranged, just as in the sale of a detached
house.

By contrast, the sale of a cooperative unit amounts to an im-

plicit "assumption" by the purchaser of that unit's pro rata share of the
blanket mortgage on the project. Hence the cash paid by the purchaser
of a resale cooperative unit may represent three components: (1) the

amortization of the blanket mortgage which has occurred since payments were commenced on it; (2) the original unit purchaser's down-

payment; and (3) any increase in value which may have occurred since
the project was completed due to inflation or to improvements.2 1
Obviously, the longer the project is occupied the higher the cash

required by a resale purchaser is likely to be, and the greater the difficulty the seller can anticipate in finding a buyer with sufficient cash

and a willingness to invest it in the unit. The seller may be willing
to take a promissory note from the purchaser in lieu of some part of

this cash, and may be able to secure such a note with an interest in
some real or personal property belonging to the purchaser. But an installment sale by the unit owner may jeopardize the standing of the purchaser under I.R.C. section 216.22
Additional problems arise if the installment seller desires a secur-

ity interest in the unit. Under one approach, the purchaser may pledge
21. Some cooperatives limit the resale price by bylaw to the original down payment
made by the seller, and others allow him to recoup only his improvements, his share
of the mortgage amortization achieved, and some cost-of-living adjustment factor. See
FHA Model Form of Bylaws § 8(d), reproduced in J. KRASNOWEICKi, HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 317, 323 (1969); NATIONAL COMM'N. ON URBAN PROBLEMS,
BUILDING THE AMRICAN CrIy 137 (1968). Many cooperatives impose no restrictions
on resale prices at all.
22. I.R.C. § 216(b)(2) defines a "tenant-shareholder" as one "whose stock is fully
paid-up in an amount" reasonably related to the unit's share of the corporation's equity
in the project. The applicable regulation, Treas. Reg. § 1.216-1(e) (1977), appears
to say that this relationship is to be determined "as of the date of the original issuance
of the stock". Arguably, an installment sale would qualify if the purchaser made
a cash payment equal to the unit's share of the original equity, but this is not clear.
Alternatively, the purchaser might structure the transaction so as to "fully pay" for
the stock with cash, but to pay some additional amount, by way of a promissory
note, for the assignment of the proprietary lease. The difficulty with this argument
is that the stock and lease are invariably required by their own terms or the applicable
corporate charter or bylaws to be held by the same person. In sum, whether any
installment sale can qualify under § 216 is problematic. This is unfortunate, since
there seems to be no policy reason whatever to make the tax benefits of § 216 hinge
on an all-cash sale. See Miller, Tax Problems of the Housing Cooperative Under
the 80% Income Rule, 18 PRAc. LAWYER 81 (No. 4, Apr. 1972).
Since an installment purchaser is arguably not a "tenant-shareholder", it is entirely
conceivable that a single installment sale could so reduce the total income from tenant
shareholders that the cooperative would cease to qualify under the 80% test of § 216. -. -
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his stock and assign his interest in the proprietary lease to the seller
as security; this may be satisfactory, but many sellers may feel that the
legal protection available from such a scheme is inferior to that which
a mortgage would give them. Two barriers to the use of a conventional
legal mortgage are the lack of a separate, reliable legal description of
the unit, and the fact that the legal title is held by the cooperative corporation rather than the occupants of the unit. In addition, many cooperatives impose rights of first refusal or other forms of restrictions
on the resale of units which might make it difficult for a secured party
to realize on the security, no matter what form it takes.
It would be possible to reduce cash requirements for cooperative
resale buyers if institutional lenders were willing to make "second"
loans on the security of cooperative units. Any such loans would
clearly be subordinate to the existing blanket first mortgage on the
entire project, since there is normally no provision in such mortgages
for the release of individual units from the lien's coverage. Institutional lenders could take pledges and assignments of the stock and lease
on the units as security. There is no doubt that such a method is
legally workable, although subject to the same uncertainties as purchase-money financing by vendors mentioned in the foregoing paragraph. Moreover, whether the regulatory agencies which supervise institutional lenders will recognize such loans as secured, rather than as
mere personal loans, is doubtful in many jurisdictions. 23 These financing problems tend to be reflected in large cash requirements for entry
into cooperatives, and consequently limit access to relatively highincome purchasers.
It is quite possible that the corporation might decide to refinance
the original blanket mortgage on the project; this might be done because the original mortgage is of the balloon type and has reached maturity,2 ' because lower interest rates have become available, or because
additional cash is needed for repairs or improvements. This last objective might also be achieved by the placement of a second blanket mortgage on the property without disturbing the first. It is apparent that
23. See notes 108-113 infra and accompanying text.
24. While most buildings newly constructed for cooperative use are financed with
fully-amortized mortgages, it is not unusual to find a balloon mortgage on a building
which is converted from ordinary rental to co-op use. Indeed, if the interest rate
on the existing mortgage is significantly below current rates at the time of conversion,
it would be foolish to refinance at the time of conversion, notwithstanding the balloon
feature of the old loan. See Offering Statement, 72-84 Barrow Street, reprinted in
2A P. Romr & M. RESKN, COOP RAT7VB HOUSING LAW AND PiCTxcn, at 245, 288
app. (1975).
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either refinancing or additional financing can result in higher monthly
assessments on the members than they anticipated when they joined
the cooperative. If an appropriate vote of the directors or members

is forthcoming, the added assessments will be imposed on all members,
whether they agree with the decision or not.25

Thus, each member's

financial future lies to some extent in the hands of his neighbors;
a situation which some might think uncomfortable, and which is largely
avoided by the condominium form of ownership.2"

One should not assume that permanent financing is always essential to the sale of either condominiums or cooperatives.

Especially in

retirement developments, all-cash purchases are quite common, since
many buyers have just sold larger detached houses, often at substantial
gains. Retirees usually wish to reinvest these funds and find the pur-

chase of a condominium or cooperative unit a convenient way of doing
so. Moreover, federal income tax on the gain from the sale of the pre-

vious house may be avoided entirely if the new unit costs at least as
much as the sales price of the house sold.27

This benefit is available

whether a condominium or a cooperative unit is purchased, and does
not depend on the presence or absence of mortgage financing on the
new unit.
III.

CONSTRUCTION FINANCING OF CONDOMINIUMS

Although the financing of condominium construction is much like
25. For example, the Standard Form Cooperative Bylaws published by the New
York Attorney General provide, at Art. I, sec. 7:
The Board of Directors shall have discretionary power to . . . determine the
cash requirements of the Corporation to be paid as aforesaid by the shareholder-tenants under their respective proprietary leases. Every such determination by the Board of Directors shall be final and conclusive as to all shareholder-tenants ..
See P. ROHAN & M. iSKmN, CooPrnaAnv

HousiNG LAw AND PRAcICE 24.67 app.

(1975). Similar language is found in most proprietary leases. The decision-making
power of the Board is generally very broad, and could even extend to a resolution
to sell the project and distribute the proceeds to the members. See Anderson, Cooperative Apartments in Florida: A Legal Analysis, 12 U. MIAMI L REV. 13, 35 (1957).
26. But not completely. Even in a condominium, it is possible for the owners'
association to levy larger-than-expected assessments to cover extravagant improvements
to the recreational facilities or other common areas. Since tire to common areas
is held by the unit owners in tenancy in common, the association cannot mortgage
them. Nonetheless, the assessments themselves are liens on the units, whether particular
owners approve of the expenditures or not. In some cases, condominium bylaws may
place an upper limit on assessment amounts.
27. I.R.C. § 1034, which permits this deferral of gain, applies whether the old
or the new residence is a condominium or a cooperative; see LR.C. § 1034(f); Rev.
Rul. 64-31, 1964-1 C.B. 300. If a cooperative unit is purchased, the unit's proportional
share of the project's mortgage indebtedness is included in the purchase price for purposes of qualifying under § 1034; see Rev. Rul. 60-76, 1960-1 C.B. 296.
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subdivision financing, there are important differences. 28 The documentation of a condominium project is much more complex, its marketability more speculative (at least, from the perspective of many institutional lenders), and the risk of loss it presents in the event of failure
correspondingly greater.
Every new condominium project begins with site selection and acquisition. Developers commonly use their own capital to pay the cost
of necessary land options. Before applications for institutional financing can be made, however, other costs must be incurred; surveys, engineering and market studies, and architects' fees, for example. These
may be financed by use of the developer's cash or the contributions
Df his business associates, or through unsecured debt. In some cases
these expenses are reimbursed out of the first draw of funds on the construction loan.
Upon exercise of the land option, the developer may be expected
to pay the full cash price of the land to the seller. Often, however,
the seller can be persuaded to sell on an installment basis and to accept
a minimal initial cash payment. This installment indebtedness will
usually be Secured by a mortgage, and it will be necessary for the seller
to subordinate his lien to that of the construction loan,2 since virtually
all construction lenders, as a matter of policy or the requirements of
their governmental regulatory agencies, insist on first priority for the
construction mortgage. Unless it is to be paid off from the proceeds
of the construction loan, the land seller's subordinated mortgage (like
the construction mortgage) must contain a partial release clause emabling the sale of individual units free of the lien.
When the land has been optioned and the necessary background
studies completed, the developer is ready to apply for a construction
loan. This submission is usually more comprehensive than would be
expected in a detached-house subdivision, and the developer may seek
the assistance of a mortgage loan broker in preparing and presenting
it to prospective construction lenders. Such lenders will be particularly
interested in the developer's own financial position, prior condominium
experience, and reputation; they will also analyze the market demand
information, architectural and engineering work, and general demo28.

Good general discussions of condominium construction financing include K.

ROMNEY, ComomaINIuM DEVELOPMENT GUIDE ch. 7 (1974); Fegan, supra note 16;
?feiler, supra note 16.
1. 29. Subordination by vendors is. discussed in Note, Purchase Money Subordination
Agreements in California: An Analysis of Conditional Subordination, 45 S. CAL. L.
R v. 1109 (1972).
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graphic and locational data submitted by the developer. In many cases
the construction lender will make no commitment until permanent
financing has been arranged for the sales of units; hence, the developer
will make a similar submission of information to prospective permanent
lenders, who are generally concerned with the same factors. The permanent financing commitment is not only a prerequisite to construction
financing in many cases, but comprises a powerful marketing tool as
well, especially if it ties the permanent lender to a fixed interest rate in
a rising interest market.
A project does not become a condominium until some basic document-usually termed a master deed, declaration, or plan of unit
ownership-is executed by the owners of the real estate and filed for
record. This master deed describes the project, the individual units,
and the common areas; it assigns weights to each unit for voting and
assessment purposes; it provides for a lien on the units to secure the
assessments; and it may contain such covenants as a right of first refusal
upon resale by a unit owner.3 0 The master deed may be filed whenever the owners desire, but in many cases the construction lender will
insist that filing be delayed until some fixed percentage of the units
have been "presold"-that is, until prospective unit purchasers have
paid earnest money deposits and signed purchase agreements on them.
On the other hand, no conveyances by deed of units can occur until
the master deed has been filed.31 Given these constraints, the filing
usually occurs sometime towards the end of the construction period.
Construction loan mortgages on condominium projects can be insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) under section
234(d) of the National Housing Act.32 This insurance coverage, which
is not generally available on construction loans in detached-house subdivisions, is not particularly attractive to most developers. The principal
amount of the loan may be as high as 90% of the "replacement cost"
of the project;83 in substance, this means the actual cost of land and
improvements. 34 By contrast, conventional construction loans are
30. Some writers have questioned whether such a clause may constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation or may violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Neither
result seems justifiable or probable. See 1 (pt. 2) P. RoxA & M. REsKiN, CONDOMnmM LAw AND PRACTCE § 10.03 (1976). The FHA approved form of master
deed does not contain a right of first refusal.
31. See 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(d) (1) (1977) (FHA-insured condominium mortgages).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (Supp. V 1975); applicable regulations are found at 24
C.F.R. §§ 234.1ff (1977).
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1715y(e)(2) (1970).
34. 24 C.F.RL § 234.505(h) (1977).
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rarely made for more than 75% or 80% of value, but "value" as calculated by the conventional lender may be as high as the total retail sale
price of the units, which will generally exceed the project's cost by a substantial margin. 35 Thus, conventional construction financing may
actually be for as much or more money than FHA-insured financing.
The only other significant advantage of an FHA-insured construction
mortgage is that the developer is assured that FHA mortgage insurance
will also be available on the permanent loans on individual units as they
36
are sold.
Unfortunately, FHA-insured construction loans have numerous
disadvantages. ERA regulations impose dollar limits on the mortgage
amount per unit, and effectively eliminate luxury or even high-middleincome projects.3 7 The developer must enter into a regulatory agreement with FRA which may significantly limit his discretion in managing
the construction and marketing of the project.38 FHA mortgage insurance premiums must be paid in addition to interest, fees, and discounts charged by the lending institution. Moreover, FHA processing
of multifamily mortgage insurance applications has the reputation of
being slow and cumbersome, and FHA minimum property standards
with respect to some construction features may appear excessive to
some developers.
In light of these problems, it is not surprising that there has been
relatively little construction lending under the section 234 program.
An internal study of FHA's condominium activity has recommended
major changes in the program, but they would require legislative action
and have not been seriously considered by Congress at this writing. 0
Despite FRA's early influence in the promulgation of state condomin35. See K. ROMNEY,

CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT GUIDE § 7.04 (1974).
36. Loans on individual units in a project not previously covered by an FHA
blanket mortgage are insurable by FHA only if the project contains eleven or fewer
units, National Housing Act § 234(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1715y(c) (Supp. V 1975). An
internal study of condominium financing by the Federal Housing Administration has
criticized this requirement as unnecessarily restrictive. See U.S. DEP'T OF HoUSINO
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, CONDOMINInM STUDY (1975).
37. The limits have been increased on several occasions. At this writing they
range from $19,500 for a no-bedroom unit in a low-rise building to $43,758 for a
unit with four or more bedrooms in an elevator building. The elevator-building limits
may be increased by as much as 50% in high cost areas. 24 C.F.R. §§ 234.525-.530
(1977).
38. 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(f) (1977).
39. U.S. DEP'T OF HousINo AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HUD-FHA CONDOMINIUMS: THEIR FUTUE (1975).
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ium legislation, it has become a minor factor in condominium financ40
ing.
Developers of condominium projects sometimes do not complete
construction. Failure to do so may result from poor planning and management of the construction work, inadequate budgeting, unanticipated
increases in costs, weather problems, strikes, or weak market acceptance of the project. Abandonment will invariably constitute a default
under the terms of the construction loan mortgage, and the lender may
elect to foreclose. In this setting there are usually unpaid workmen,
subcontractors, or suppliers who are entitled to file mechanics' liens.
In addition, the prospective purchasers of units in the project will have
signed contracts of sale and made down payments or earnest money
deposits with the developer; some such contracts may have been executed before construction began, and some afterward. These three
groups, the construction lender, mechanics' lienors, and vendees often
find themselves adverse to one another in respect to rights in the real
estate.
Such problems are not unique to condominium developments;
they also occur with speculative subdivisions and other types of construction. We discuss them here because condominiums have frequently been defaulted upon during construction in recent years, and
because condominium statutes sometimes contain provisions which bear
on these disputes. The problem of priorities as between construction
lenders and mechanics' lien claimants will not be covered in this article. 4 1 Suffice it to say that, in general, the relative priority of the,
lender and the lien claimant will depend on the language of the mechanics' lien statute, the timing of commencement of work on the project
vis-a-vis the recordation of the construction mortgage, and the question
of whether the advances made by the construction lender were optional
or obligatory. 2
Priorityas between construction lender and vendees
A difficult conflict may arise with respect to earnest money
40. During the first half of the 1970's, FHA blanket condominium mortgages never
reached an annual rate of 10,000 units, and was only 1277 units in 1975. See U.S.
DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 1975 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 120
(1976).

41. See generally Note, Construction Lending-General Contractor v. Lender, 54
N.C.L. REv. 952 (1976).
42. See Kratovil & Werner, Mortgages for Construction and the Lien Priorities
Problem-the "Unobligatory" Advance, 41 TFNN. L. Rpv. 311 (11974).
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deposits or down payments (the terms are used here synomously)
collected from intended unit vendees before and during the construction period. If these funds, which may be very substantial, are available for current use by the developer, they may help him solve serious
cash shortage problems, but at high risk to the vendees.43 The FHA 41
and the statutes of a few states 45 require that such deposits be
escrowed pending completion and transfer of title of the individual
units, making them inaccessible to the developer. Such provisions are
highly desirable. Where this is not the law, a problem arises in situations in which the developer has invaded the deposits and subsequently
abandons the project prior to completion; the unit purchasers may well
be left with only their personal rights of action against the developer
(who is often insolvent). Even if the construction lender forecloses
and completes construction, the original unit subscribers may have
neither the right to complete their purchases by paying the remainder
of the original contract price, nor the right to a return of their deposits.
This issue may be characterized as one of priority as between the
purchase contracts and the construction mortgage. The contract
vendee has, under the law of most states, an equitable lien on the realty
to secure the return of his down payment if the vendor fails to complete
the contract. 46 The difficulty is that the lien's enforceability is constrained in two respects: first, it may be subordinate to pre-existing
liens, such as the construction mortgage, if it arises after that mortgage
is recorded; and second, it is not enforceable even against a subsequent
mortgagee or purchaser who has no notice of the existence of the
vendee's contract.47 The latter constraint may not be a serious problem in most cases; seldom will a construction lender grant a loan without first asking about preconstruction sales activity, and the developer
43. See Damian, Condominium Development: Representing the Developer, in CoNDOMINiUM DEVELOPMENT 35, 61 (Prac. Law Inst. 1971).

44. See HA Subscription and Purchase Agreement, Form No. 3279, cl. 1, reprinted
in I P. RoHAN & M. RESmN, CoNDOMINmiM LAw Ai PRAcCTxc § 9.04[6] (1976).
45. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 55-79.95 (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.202 (Supp.
1977) (permitting the developer to use the money to defray construction costs if the
contract of sale so provides). See Note, Recent Innovations in State Condominium
Legislation, 48 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 994, 999 (1974); Note, Florida CondominiumsnDeveloper Abuses and Security Law Implications Create a Need For a State Regulatory
Agency, 25 U. F"A. L. REv. 350, 358 (1973). The better approach is to prohibit
by statute all developer use of deposit- funds; the significance -of contract language
permitting his use of deposits is unlikely to be understood by lay purchasers.
46. Gribble v. Stearman & Kaplan, Inc., 249 Md. 289, 239 A.2d 573 (1968). See
generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1384 (1954).
47. National Indemnity Co. v. Banks, 376 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1967); Mihranian,
Inc. v. Padula, 134 N.J. Super. 557, -342A.2d 523 (1975).
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will ordinarily be eager to inform the lender of the contracts which have
been signed. 48 The matter is more difficult if the purchase contract
is signed after the construction mortage has been recorded. In State
Savings and Loan Association v. Kauaian Development Co., 49 the
Hawaii Supreme Court drew a distinction between subscription agree-

ments entered into before and after the creation of the construction
mortgage. Agreements executed after the mortgage were obviously
subordinate to it, the court thought, apparently because of the construc-

tive notice the public records imparted to vendees, while those executed before the mortgage recordation had priority.

However, the

court observed that even prior subscription agreements could be made
subordinate to the mortgage by express language of subordination,

which could be placed in the purchase contract or in a separate document signed by the vendee.

The court did not discuss the degree of

specificity that would be necessary in such clauses, nor whether it
would require that they be intelligible to the laymen signing them.
As a consequence of the Kauaian reasoning, most purchase agree-

ments in use now probably contain subordination language;50 a foreclosing construction lender would thus appear to be free to disregard
the agreement and sell the unit to another purchaser and would have

no obligation to return the deposit to the contract vendee.
However, the enforceability of such subordination clauses may be
open to serious doubt. The purchaser will ordinarily be entirely un-

sophisticated, and is unlikely to have any concept of the significance
of the clause. In addition, the clause will seldom contain details of the

proposed construction financing to which the vendee is being asked to
subordinate.

By analogy to the cases involving so-called "automatic"

48. See Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 228 N.E.2d
841 (1967); Palmer v. Crews Lumber Co., Inc., 510 P.2d 269 (Okla. 1973). These
cases suggest that it is sufficient that the subsequent lender knows a contract has
been executed, whether or not he is aware of the terms of the contract, the vendee's
identity, or the amount of any downpayment made.
49. 50 Haw. 540, 445 P.2d 109 (1968).
50. See, e.g., Olympic Towers Purchase Agreement, reprinted in 1A P. RoH1N
& M. REsKiN, CoN-'mommmI LAw AND PRACTICE, 118.17 app. (1976):
The Purchaser agrees that all terms and provisions of this contract are and
shall be subject and subordinate to the lien of any building loan mortgage
heretofore or hereafter made and any advances heretofore or hereafter made
thereon and any payments or expenses already made or incurred or which hereafter may be made or incurred, pursuant to the terms thereof, or incidental
thereto, or to protect the security thereof, to the full extent thereof without
the execution of any further legal documents by the Purchaser. This subordination shall apply whether such advances are voluntary or involuntary and whether
made in accordance with the building loan schedule.
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subordination of purchase-money financing by land vendors to devel-

opers, it might well be argued that such subordinations by contract
vendees are too vague or too unfair to enforce.5 1
Even a contract vendee who signed his contract after the construc-

tiuon mortgage was recorded, or who has executed a valid subordination clause, might nonetheless manage to persuade a court of his priority. If the developer's default is traceable in part to the failure of the

construction lender to monitor and supervise the progress of the project
as its documents gave it the right to do, or if the lender negligently

permitted the developer to divert loan funds away from the project, the
vendee might argue that he is the third party beneficiary of the con-

struction loan agreement, and that the proper remedy for the lender's
breach of that agreement is a loss of priority for the construction loan. 2
Depending on the facts, an argument against the lender's priority may
also be based on estoppel. If the lender has reviewed and approved
the sales price schedule and the purchase agreement forms, has sup-

plied the developer with criteria for qualifying prospective purchasers
in respect to income, credit worthiness, and the like, and has mandated

the pre-completion sale of some fixed number of units as a condition
of the construction loan agreement, a court might well find the lender
estopped by its extensive involvement in the vendor-vendee relationship to deny the priority of the vendee's lien.5
51. See Handy v. Gordon, 65 Cal. 2d 578, 422 P.2d 329, 55 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1967);
Grooms v. Williams, 227 Md. 165, 175 A.2d 575 (1961). Cf. Starr v. Mooslin, 14
Cal. App. 3d 988, 92 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1971), holding an attorney liable for malpractice
in incompetently drafting a subordination agreement.
52. See Planters Lumber Co. v. Wilson Co., 413 S.W.2d 55 (Ark. 1967), elevating
a mechanics' lien above a construction mortgage to the extent the mortgage proceeds
were not used on the project; Middlebrook-Anderson Co. v. Southwest Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 18 Cal. App. 3d 1023, 96 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1971), in which a vendor of land
who held a subordinated purchase-money deed of trust had his priorities elevated above
that of the construction lender on this theory; Kennedy v. Betts, 33 Md. App. 258,
364 A.2d 74 (1976); Cambridge Acceptance Corp. v. Hockstein, 102 N.J. Super. 435,
246 A.2d 138 (1968). But see Pope Heating & Air Cond. Co. v. Garrett-Bromfield
Mortgage Co., 29 Colo. App. 169, 480 P.2d 602 (1971), holding a subordination agreement unconditional and binding despite diversion of construction loan funds; Forest
Inc. v. Guaranty Mortgage Co., 534 S.W.2d 853 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (semble);
See also Falls Lumber Co. v. Heman, 114 Ohio App. 262, 181 N.E.2d 713 (1961),
in which a construction lender was held liable in tort to a contract vendee for its
failure to disburse construction funds in accordance with the applicable statute, thereby
permitting mechanics' liens to be filed against the property; cf. Gardner Plumbing,
Inc. v. Cottril, 44 Ohio St. 2d 111, 338 N.E.2d 757 (1975).
53. Cf. Fikes v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 533 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1975), holding
a construction lender's lien limited to funds actually spent on construction and not
diverted, as against the claim of a prior contract vendee of which the lender had
knowledge; Tucson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sundell, 106 Ariz. 137, 472 P.2d 6
(1970) (sernble) in which the court relied on the fact that the vendee had no knowl-
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An alternative approach for the vendee might be based on an analogy to the cases which have permitted subcontractors and materials
suppliers to assert an equitable lien on any undisbursed portion of the

construction loan funds if the usual mechanics' lien remedies are unavailing to them.5a

In equity, the contract vendee would seem to have

as strong a moral claim to these funds as do those who have invested
labor and materials, at least if construction has been completed without
exhausting the construction loan account and the vendee's deposit has

been used for construction purposes.

Unfortunately, this argument

may be ineffective in those jurisdictions which have codified the equi-

table lien concept without including contract vendees among its beneficiaries.

New York, for example, has created a statutory trust consist-

ing of the down payments of contract vendees.55 However, they may
recover their funds after the developer's default only if they have not
been used in improving the property; in addition, the usual classes of
mechanics' lien claimants have first priority on the trust funds. 6 This
edge of the construction mortgage. No cases have been found in which the estoppel
argument has been raised by a junior vendee. The tendency of courts to protect contract
vendees against the literal language of subordination clauses they have signed is illustrated by First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ott, 285 So. 2d 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973), in which the developer refinanced the original construction loan with the same
lender; the court refused to enforce the subordination agreement in vendee's contract
and she was permitted to take free of the refinanced mortgage. In Security Nat'l
Bank v. Village Mall at Hillcrest, 85 Misc. 2d 771, 382 N.Y.S.2d 882, 889 (Sup.
Ct. 1976), the Attorney General of New York argued that the construction lender's
lien should be subordinated to the liens of contract vendees because the lender had
(1) modified the construction loan agreement without recording the modification, (2)
participated in a public offering of the condominium project without making the required disclosures to offerees under New York law, (3) participated in a violation
of the statutory provisions allowing vendees' deposits to be used only for improvements,
and (4) charged usurious interest rates. The court found that triable issues of fact
were involved and denied summary judgment on the merits of these claims.
54. See Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. Union Bank, 25 Cal. App. 3d 259, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 665 (1972); J.G. Plumbing Inc. v. Coastal Mortgage Co., 329 So. 2d 393 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Crane Co. v. Fine, 221 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1969). As a result
of statutory change the remedy is apparently no longer available in California; see
Boyd & Lovesee Lumber Co. v. Modular Marketing Corp., 44 Cal. App. 3d 460, 118
Cal. Rptr. 699 (1975). A similar remedy, known as the "stop notice", is available
by statute in a few states, but probably could not be asserted by contract vendees.
See Comment, Mechanics' Liens: The "Stop Notice" Comes to Washington, 49 WASH.
L. REv. 685 (1974).
55. N.Y. LIEN LAW § 71-a (McKinney 1966).
56. See Security Nat'l Bank v. Village Mall at Hillcrest, Inc., 85 Misc. 2d 771,
382 N.Y.S.2d 883, 889 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Glazer v. Alison Homes Corp., 62 Misc.
2d 1017, 309 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct. 1970). The latter case, though sound in policy,
seems to go quite beyond the statutory language and permits contract vendees to assert
a lien on funds which were wrongfully diverted by the developer from construction
loan proceeds, although the opinion concedes that mechanics' liens would have a superior
claim to these funds.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977

19

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 1, Art. 6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13: 15

approach seems entirely inadequate to protect the vendees, although
it may be better than no protection at all.
As a matter of policy, it is entirely reasonable to impose on the
construction lender a duty to return vendees' deposits in cases in which
the lender had played an active role in approving or supervising the
developer's marketing program. The lender is far better able than the
vendee to investigate the developer's solvency, experience, and reliability, and to spread the risk of the developer's default. Moreover, any
construction lender wishing to avoid this risk may easily do so merely
by requiring that all deposits by vendees be placed in escrow. The
law should not permit developers (and construction lenders) to rely
upon vendees' down payments as a means of financing construction;
doing so is an indicator that the developer is dangerously underfunded,
and a lender who actively countenances such a procedure should be
57
held accountable to the vendees for their loss.
Priorityas between mechanics' lien claimants and vendees
The rights of mechanics' lien claimants in condominium projects
raise problems similar to, but more intricate than, those of claims made
on subdivision lots. Even if the work was done or the materials supplied on only a single lot or unit, the matter is not simple. It is clear
enough that if the vendee enters into his contract of purchase after the
work has been completed and the lien filed of record, the lien will have
priority and the vendee will take subject to it. 8 This means that if
the developer (or his general contractor) are unavailable for recovery,
as is all too common, the unit vendee will suffer the loss unless he is
protected by an owner's policy of title insurance.
If the vendee acquires legal title by deed to the unit or lot after
the work has been done and the lien has "attached","0 but before the
57. In some respects the matter is similar to Connor v. Great Western Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969), in which a
construction lender was held liable to home purchasers for its failure to adequately
supervise the construction of houses with serious structural defects. Although Connor
has not been widely followed, see Callaizakas v. Astor Developer Co., 4 II. App.
3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512 (1972), the case of diversion of vendees' downpayments
seems an especially appealing one for application of the concept, since developers'
marketing programs are so generally superintended by construction lenders, particularly
in condominium projects.
58. United Accounts, Inc. v. Larson, 121 N.W.2d 628 (N.D. 1963); Annot., 85
A.L.IL 927, 928 (1933).
59. The exact time at which priority attaches varies among jurisdictions. Many
fix it as of the day the first work is done on the overall construction project, and
others on the date the lien claimant first performed his work. Less popular rules
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lien is filed of record, he may be entirely innocent of any actual knowledge of the lien's attachment. A few jurisdictions, mostly in the South,

protect bona fide purchasers in this situation, granting them priority
over the lien. 6° Most states, however, hold the vendee's interest sub-

ject to the lien, either on the ground that even BFP's are subject to
mechanics' liens6 ' or that the very fact of construction activity on the
land imparts notice of the potential filing of liens, and thus negates BFP

status.6 2 Moreover, owner's title insurance coverage is unlikely to assist the purchaser on these facts; many policies expressly exclude cover-

age for unfiled liens.
Suppose the vendee's contract of purchase predates the attachment of the lien, even though the conveyance by deed occurs later.

May he argue that his vendee's lien created by execution of the contract
has chronological, and thus legal, priority over the mechanics' liens? In
Wayne Building & Loan Co. v. Yarborough,6 3 the Ohio Supreme
Court so held, although the vendee was given priority only to the

extent of down payments made before the liens attached at the commencement of the work; the vendee had no priority as to further
payments he made on the contract after work began. The decision ap-

pears to place no emphasis on whether the lien claimants had notice
of the executed contract of purchase at the time they began their work,
attach the lien at the time the general contract or the claimant's contract is entered
into or recorded, or when the notice of lien is filed of record. Under all of these
rules except the last-mentioned, a lien may attach without any clear evidence of the
claim appearing in the public records. The lien must usually be "perfected" by filing
of record within some fixed period after the work is completed, and is then said to
"relate back" to the attachment date. See R. KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAw AND
PaicricE § 214 (1972); 4 AmEuCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.106F (A.J. Casner ed.
1952).
60. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 376.010 (Supp. 1976); Walker v. Valley Plumbing
Co., 370 S.W.2d 136 (Ky. 1963); First State Bank v. Stacey, 37 Tenn. App. 223,
261 S.W.2d 245 (1953); Wood v. Barnes, 420 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967);
Comfortcraft Heating, Inc. v. Salamone, 19 App. Div. 760, 241 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1963);
Bryant v. Ellenburg, 106 Ga. 510, 127 S.E.2d 468 (1962).
61. Schrader Iron Works, Inc. v. Lee, 26 Cal. App. 3d 621, 103 Cal. Rptr. 107
(1972); State Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Kauaian Devel. Co., 50 Haw. 540, 445 P.2d 109,
123 (1968); Metropolitan Water Co. v. Hild, 415 P.2d 970 (Okla. 1966). See generally
G. T ompsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 5218 n.69 (1957).
62. The knowledge of work in progress may be actual or constructive. See Guaranty Pest Control, Inc. v. Commercial Inv. & Devel. Corp., 288 Ala. 604, 264 So.
2d 163 (1972); Capital Bank & Trust Co. v. Broussard Paint & Wallpaper Co., 198
So. 2d 204 (La. App. 1967); Clark Certified Concrete Co. v. Lindberg, 216 Md. 576,
141 A.2d 685 (1958); J;R. Meade Co. v. Forward Constr. Co., 526 S.W.2d 21 (Mo.
App. 1975); H. TFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1578 (1939); Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 944
(1973).
63. 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 228 N.E.2d 841, 849-50 (1967).
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but such notice would presumably strengthen the vendee's position.
Thus, in one Texas case the lien claimants were permitted priority for
work done up to the time they learned of the executed contract, but
not thereafter. 4 However, the existence of the purchase contract has
been fatal to the vendee in several decisions in which courts have seen
it as clearly establishing the vendee's position as an equitable "owner",
and thus a member of the class of persons whose interests were subject
to mechanic's liens.65
As these cases suggest, the relationship of vendees' and lien claimants' rights is uncertain and confused, although the lienors have usually
prevailed. The courts have vacillated between the traditional desire
to protect good faith purchasers and to enhance the reliability of the
public records, on the one hand, and the wish to construe the lien statutes liberally to aid lien claimants, on the other. One major defect in
the system lies in its failure to require potential lien claimants to record
some public notice as a condition of attachment (rather than mere perfection) of the lien. But even a change in the law in this respect would
not fully protect purchasers, since they rarely examine the public records or obtain title reports before signing purchase agreements and
making deposits. In essence, the contest is between two claimants
neither of whom has taken any formal step to give the world notice
of his lien, and each of whom is at least dimly aware of the other's
potential existence. On these facts it would be arbitrary to make priorities turn on which interest "attached" first, as by lien claimant's first
work or the vendee's execution of a contract. Given the almost universal lack of sophisticated residential unit buyers, and the alternative methods open to lien claimants, who are generally well aware of
the risks, to safeguard their interests, 66 the preferable approach to this
dilemma (short of comprehensive legislative reform) is to recognize
a prior vendee's lien for all deposits paid prior to the time the purchaser
64. Stone v. Pitts, 389 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965). The lienor's knowledge
of the vendee's interest may also be used to compel him to include the vendee as
an "owner" in the notice of lien, and failure to do so may exculpate the vendee.
See F.M. Sibley Lumber Co. v. Gottesman, 314 Mich. 60, 22 N.W.2d 72 (1946);
cf. Oklahoma Hardware Co. v. Townsend, 494 P.2d 326 (Okla. 1972). See Annot.,
48 A.L.R.3d 153 (1973).
65. Home Carpet, Inc. v. Bob Antrim Homes, Inc., 210 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 1973);
Toler v. Satterthwaite, 200 Kan. 103, 434 P.2d 814 (1967).
66. Subcontractors and materialmen may verify the developer's credit standing, may
contact the construction lender to determine whether the project is on schedule and
funds available, may insist on immediate payment in cash, or may confine their business
activities to developers who have payment bonds. None of these steps may be completely effective or feasible, but they place the potential lien claimant in a considerably
stronger position than contract vendees.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss1/6

22

Whitman: Financing Condominiums and Cooperatives

1977] FINANCING CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES

37

learns not merely that work has been done on the land, but that delinquent payments are owed to potential lien claimants.
Assuming that a condominium unit purchaser is subject to mechanics' liens, other questions arise. If the work was done or the materials supplied for several units, the common areas, or the entire project, what interests are subjected to the lien? Most of the courts which
have dealt with the issue have held that the common areas as such are
not lienable01 Often this result follows from express language in the
condominium statutes involved; the common areas have no independent legal existence apart from the units to which they are appurtenant. 8 Hence a lien claimant who has performed work only on common
areas would be expected to file the lien on the individual units-presumably all of them-whose owners had rights in the common facilities
in question. A further problem for the lien claimant is raised if some
of the units have been conveyed by the developer at the time he hires
the lien claimant-to-be. The vendees of these units might argue that
they cannot be held subject to the lien because they neither contracted
for nor consented to the work done. 9 It is likely, however, that they
would be held to have consented, or be estopped from denying their
consent, if the work in question benefitted common areas in which they
had rights and which they expected to use.
If work is performed on numerous units, the common areas, or
the project as a whole, is a lien claimant required to apportion the lien
among all of the affected units and satisfy it from each of them only
on a pro rata basis? If the law does not compel this result, the claimant
obviously has power to create great injustice among unit owners by
"picking on" some while favoring others. This issue has risen fre67. See, e.g., Country Village Heights Condominium v. Mario Bonito Inc., 79 Misc.
2d 1088, 363 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Stevens Constr. Co. v. Draper Hall,

Inc., 73 Wis. 2d 104, 242 N.W.2d 893 (1976). But see Plateau Supply Co. v. Bison
Meadows Corp., 31 Colo. App. 205, 500 P.2d 162 (1972); E.D. McGillicuddy Constr.
Co. v. Knoll Recreation Ass'n, 31 Cal. App. 3d 891, 107 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1973).
The Stevens case concludes that liens on the common areas are impermissible even
though the lien claimants commenced their work before the condominium declaration

was recorded, and thus at a time when the building was not subject to the condominium
statute.
68. FHA MODEL AcT § 9(a), supra note 2; A. FEnaER & K. STECHER, LAW
OF CONDOWNIUM § 117 (1967).
69. See, e.g., Romito Bros. Elec. Constr. Co. v. Frank A. Flannery, Inc., 40 Ohio
St. 2d 79, 320 N.E.2d 294 (1974). The New York statute permits the filing of a
lien on an individual unit only if the work was requested by the owner of the unit
or was for emergency repairs. See Country Village Heights Condominium v. Mario
Bonito, Inc., 79 Misc. 2d 1088, 363 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
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quently in the subdivision context, and the courts have almost uniformly
held that, if the lien is susceptible of reasonable apportionment, then
apportionment is required. 7° In a condominium, apportionment would
seldom be difficult to calculate, since the units are even more likely
to be of similar value and have similar construction than subdivision
houses. Moreover, many condominium statutes expressly provide that
a lien on more than one unit can be satisfied and discharged by pro
rata payment by each unit owner. 71 One court has interpreted such
language as applicable only when the lien is incurred by one or more
individual unit owners, rather than by a developer,72 but this construction seems strained and inequitable. Whatever the source of the lien,
it should be dischargable as to any unit when its owner pays his share;
this seems to be the prevalent view.
Mechanics' liens and the assessments of an owners' association
may interrelate in at least two ways. It is common for the association
to begin functioning and collecting assessments prior to the completion
of some phases of the project. If this occurs, a contest may arise as
to priority between the mechanics' liens and the association's lien for
unpaid assessments. This matter may be resolved by reference to the
jurisdiction's condominium statute. Many statutes provide that the assessment lien is superior to all liens except ad valorem taxes and the
first mortgage on any unit.7 3 However, a New York court, apparently
contradicting the statutory formulation, has given priority to the mechanics' liens on the ground that the association's liens do not come into
existence and acquire a priority date until some notice or action to en74
force them is filed.
70. Apportionment of mechanics' liens required in Weaver v. Harland, 176 Va.
224, 10 S.E.2d 547 (1940). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 3130 (West 1974); DEL.
CODE tit. 25, § 2713 (1974).
71. FHA MODEL Acr, § 9(b), supra note 2; A. FERBER & K. STEcHER, LAW
oF CoNDOMm4iM § 117 (1967).
72. E.D. McGillicuddy Constr. Co. v. Knoll Recreation Assoc., 31 Cal. App. 3d
891, 107 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1973); the court did not explain why allocation of the lien
on a pro rated basis among unit owners was impractical. The opinion seemed to
rely upon the fact that all purchasers had owner's title insurance coverage-a consideration which seems both irrelevant and improper.
73. See FHA MODEL AcT § 23(a), supra note 2; A. FPiBER & K. STEctmR, LAW
oF CoNDoMNm-uM § 128 (1967). A few statutes expressly grant priority to mechanics'
liens; see IDAHO CODE § 55-1518 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47A-22(a) (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 703.23(1)(a) (West Spec. Supp. 1977).
74. See Security Nat'l Bank v. Village Mall at Hillcrest, 85 Misc. 2d 771, 382
N.Y.S.2d 882, 896 (Sup. CL 1976); cf. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-z (McKinney
Supp. 1967).
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The New York statute expands the rights of mechanics' lien claimants in another fashion as well, granting them, for work done on common areas, a lien on funds collected by the owner's association. 75 This
remedy was apparently thought necessary because of the impermissibility of liening the common areas directly, the difficulty of proving that
unit owners requested the work done on common areas, and the cumbersomeness of apportionment of the lien among a large number of individual units. From the lienor's viewpoint this remedy is probably
superior to merely filing an action to collect the debt owed. In cases
in which the association itself requested the work done the procedure
is reasonable, but if the work was done at the developer's request, it
is difficult to see the fairness of imposing on the association the duty
of repaying it.
IV.

FINANCING CONVERSIONS TO CONDOMINIUM
AND COOPERATIVE STATUS

Rental apartment buildings are frequently converted to condominium status. The converter may be the original landlord, or the building may be sold to an intermediary who will handle the conversion and
marketing process. Often some remodeling and refurbishing of the
apartments, lobby, and recreational facilities is necessary. The financial rewards of the conversion can be extremely attractive, since buildings often sell for as much as 33 to 40 percent more than their previous
value as rental properties. 6 For landlords who find themselves beset
with rising costs for maintenance and utilities, complaints from tenants,
and the growing influence of rent control ordinances, conversion may
77
seem an ideal way out of an uncomfortable position.
At the same time, conversion is a risky business. 78 Marketing of
the converted apartments may be slow, especially if numerous other
buildings are being converted or new condominiums built in the same
market. It is usually desirable to keep the unsold units rented, but
75. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 339-1(2) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
76. See Jaskol, A Lender Looks at Condominium Conversions, 4 REAL EST. REV.
70 (No. 1, 1974); NAT'L Assoc. op HOME BuU.DERS, Now Is the Time for a Good
Condominium Conversion, N.A.H.B.J.-ScoPE (June 4, 1973). On the treatment of
the sale profit as capital gain or ordinary income, see Shapiro & Lemiech, Tax Planning the Condominium Conversion-Analysis of Capital Gain Possibilities, 1 J. REAL
EsT. TAx. 184 (1974).
77. 1 P. ROHAN & M. REsmN, CONDoMInqum LAW & PRACIcE § 3A.01 (1976).

78. See Moss, Checklist for Successful Condominium Conversions, 5 REAL EsT.
REv. 116 (No. 3, 1975).
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vacancies often grow when the tenants know that the building is being
converted. On the other hand, in many buildings the existing tenants
cannot afford the purchase prices of the converted units, and hence are
forced out of their longtime residences; they may oppose the conversion
bitterly, and in some jurisdictions their opposition will constitute a legal
barrier. 79 Detailed discussion of these problems is beyond the scope
of the present treatment, but they must be considered carefully by any
lender who is asked to finance a conversion.
Occasionally an apartment building owner is able to manage a
conversion without resort to new blanket financing, but this can be accomplished only if the existing mortgage lender is agreeable. If the
mortgage contains a due-on-sale clause, the lender must waive it. The
lender must also be willing to join in the condominium declaration, and
must modify the existing mortgage documents by inserting a partial release clause, thereby permitting the sale of individual units free of the
blanket lien. Often the lender is uninterested in taking these steps,
or will do so only in return for financial concessions which the converter
finds unacceptable. The alternate approach for the converter is to obtain an interim loan from a different lender which will contain the
necessary language, and whose proceeds will be used to pay off the
existing loan. The attractiveness of this technique will depend on
numerous factors, including the interest rate and other costs associated
with the interim loan, and the prepayment penalty which may be demanded by the old lender.
Interim loans to finance conversions usually do not require regular
principal amortization, but do require the reduction of the principal by
some agreed amount for each condominium unit sold, much in the same
manner as blanket construction loans on subdivisions.8 0 They are usually limited to 75 or 80 percent of the property's value as a condominium, but if this would result in a loan approaching 100 percent of the
value as a rental project, the interim lender will often require some cash
investment by the converter, thus limiting the loan to, perhaps, 90
percent of the rental value. In any event, the "value" on which the
loan is based will generally include the cost of the renovations which
79. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352-e(2) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) (requiring approval of Attorney General and 35% of existing tenants); Condominium Conversion Ban Extended, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1974, at Al, col. 6, and numerous other
articles in the same period.
80. See Fantini, A PracticalPrimer for Analyzing Condominium Conversions, 34
Tim MORTGAGE BANKER 48 (Aug. 1973); Reppe, Winning Over the Condominium
Lender, 5 REAL EST. REV. 104 (No. 2, 1975).
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the converter plans to make. A portion of the interim loan may even
be disbursed in installments as these improvements are put in place,
as with a construction loan.
The interim lender is intensely concerned with the converter's
cash flow projections for the conversion period. The building must
generate enough cash to cover interest payments on the interim loan
as well as the usual operating, maintenance, and management costs of
a rental building, and the converter's obligation to pay assessments to
the new owners' association. Since a shortfall can easily result in default and foreclosure of the interim mortgage, the interim lender must
be confident that it can complete the conversion successfully if necessary.
Conversion of rental buildings to cooperatives is far less common
nationally than conversion to condominiums, but it has been a frequent
occurrence in New York. The motivations for a cooperative conversion are much the same as have been discussed above: avoidance of
rent control and high costs, and the opportunity to make a substantial
profit.sl However, the financing problems are much simpler since, absent a due-on-sale clause, the agreement of the existing lender is generally unneeded, and the conversion can proceed without his participation. Often the outstanding balance on the existing financing will be
too low to make conversion feasible. In such cases the existing loan
may be refinanced, or if its interest rate is so low that it is worth
preserving, a wrap-around second mortgage may be arranged to
provide cash for refurbishing the building and to lower the required
down payments of the apartment purchasers. Separate original, interim, and permanent loans are not necessarily required, however;
if the original financing on the rental building is satisfactory, there is
usually no reason that it cannot be carried through the conversion
period and become the permanent financing for the cooperators.
V.

PERMANENT FINANCING OF CONDOMINIUM UNITS

Permanent mortgage loans on condominium units can generally
be made by institutional lenders on the same terms as loans on detached houses or other buildings. However, the permanent lender on
a condominium unit must be concerned with many factors which are
unimportant or entirely irrelevant in the financing of subdivision
81. See P. RoHAN & M. R.smIN, COOPERATIW Housm LAW & PRAc'ic § 6.02
(1975); Richards v. Kaskel, 32 N.Y.2d 524, 300 N.E.2d 388, 347 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1973).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977

27

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 1, Art. 6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13: 15

houses.8 2 Most of these factors are related to the importance of the
owner's association and the common areas to the success (and thus the
future security value) of the project. While the discussion which follows concentrates on the permanent lender's concerns, construction
lenders should also be cognizant of the factors mentioned, since they
may be forced into a permanent lending role in the event of the developer's default on the construction loan or the permanent lender's refusal to honor its loan commitment. Indeed, unit purchasers themselves should be equally mindful of these problem areas, although they
are often insufficiently sophisticated to realize the potential dangers.
Certain precautions are particularly significant to the permanent
lender if it finances the sale of some units while other units or the common areas are still under construction or remain in the developer's
hands. Obviously, the unit being financed should itself be completed.
To ensure that the project will be successfully marketed as a condominium, many permanent lenders impose a "pre-sale requirement"; that
is, they will refuse to close any loans until the developer has entered
into binding sale contracts for some fixed percentage of the units. 83
The permanent lender will also be legitimately concerned with the developer's financial ability to complete the project, and may wish to
verify that sufficient funds remain in the construction loan account for
this purpose.
The payment of assessments to the association for unsold units can
also pose a problem. Many statutes make no distinction between sold
and unsold units, and require that assessments be collected uniformly
from all. This approach seems unreasonable from the developer's
viewpoint, since unoccupied units obviously contribute little or nothing
to certain variable costs of the association's operations; for example,
they supply no users for the swimming pool, tennis courts, or equestrian
trails. On the other hand there are many fixed costs which are independent of the number of users. A fair resolution of this problem
would be to require a somewhat smaller assessment for units still owned
by the developer than are paid for occupied units. While a two-level
assessment system is not permitted under many statutes, the same result may be achieved if the developer pays a full assessment but is en82. See generally Jackson, Attorneys for Lenders: What You Should Check in
Condominium and PUD Documentations, (pts. 1 & 2) 4 BARmSTE 47 (Winter), 55
(Spring) (1977) [hereinafter cited as Jackson]; Waldron, Curtain May Soon Rise on
Act Two of Condominium Problems, 37 MORTGAGE BANKER 27 (Nov. 1976); Pfeiler,
supra note 16.
83. See Vishny, Financing the Condominium, 1970 U. ILL. L.F; 181, 190.
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titled to reimbursement of a portion from the other owners under a
separate contract. Alternatively, the developer might pay the full assessment amounts and attempt to recover his outlays through higher
sale prices for the later-sold units. 84 In any event, the permanent
lender should ascertain that the developer is obligated to pay a fair
share of the costs of operating the association during the marketing
period and that he has the financial strength to do so; his default might
result in deteriorating physical facilities or a financially weakened or
even insolvent association. The lender might even require a cash deposit from the developer to secure these payments.
The permanent lender must also be concerned with the developer's attempts to retain control over the association until most of the
units have been sold. Often this is accomplished by creating two
classes of stock, attached to unsold and sold units respectively, with the
former having a greater voting power. For example, if the first class
has three votes per share and the second only one vote per share, the
developer can maintain effective control until the project is threefourths sold. This degree of retention of control is probably reasonable
to protect the developer against the enactment of rules or procedures
which would retard his sales.8 5 The permanent mortgagee, however,
may refuse to lend if the period of developer control will extend past
the three-fourths sales mark, and may also insist on the fixing of an
outside date by which control must pass to the unit owners irrespective
of the number of sales.
Virtually every important aspect of the association's ongoing functions concerns the permanent lender, since operational inadequacies
may be reflected in diminished security value of the units. Questions
on which the lender will need to be satisfied include the following: Is
membership in the association automatic? Has a lien for unpaid assessments been created by proper language in the declaration or master
deed? Has the association established a reasonable budget, supported
by adequate assessment amounts? Is the assessment delinquency rate
reasonably low? Have adequate reserves for repairs and replacements
been set up, with provision that they not be used except for specified
items? Has a competent management firm been hired if the project
84. See Wolfe, How to Set Up a Homeowners Association So It Works For (Not
Against) You, House & Home 74 (Sept. 1974).
85. Id. at 83. A few statutes expressly limit the period of developer control; see,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.301 (condominiums), 719.301 (cooperatives) (Supp.
1977).
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is large enough to justify it? Is the project subject to unreasonable management contracts or recreational facility leases? Is an independent annual audit made of the association's books? Has adequate blanket insurance been arranged for the common areas and exteriors of units,
with provision for increased coverage to match inflation?
Many permanent lenders insist on certain types of protection in
the condominium documentation. For example, the lender may want:
notice from the association of default in assessments by any of its mortgagors; exemption (if the lender becomes the owner of a unit through
foreclosure) from the usual clause giving the association a right of first
refusal or other right to control the subsequent transfer of the unit, and
from any restriction on leasing of units; notice of cancellation of any
insurance policies on the project; the right to examine the association's
books at reasonable times; notice of association meetings and the right
to attend; notice of any substantial loss or damage to common areas;
and the right to vote on, or even to veto, such major policy decisions
as the hiring or firing of a management firm, amendments to the declaration or bylaws, expansion or contraction of the project, or use of
hazard insurance proceeds other than for repairs.
Finally, the lender will probably wish to redraft its usual mortgage
and note forms to add special provisions relating to condominiums.80
These revisions will usually include covenants by the mortgagor to pay
his association assessments when due, to notify the lender of any delinquency notices received from the association, and to abide by all provisions of the condominium's declaration, by-laws, and rules. The
documents may require that assessments be paid to an escrow or impound account. The mortgagor may also be required to covenant not
to vote in favor of major policy changes in the project without the mortgagee's consent. Failure of the association to maintain adequate insurance coverage may be made a condition of default, and the lender may
reserve the right to pay delinquent assessments and to charge them
against the mortgagor's loan balance.
Authority of lenders, insurers,and investors

There is little controversy concerning the power of lenders to
86. Pfeiler, supra note 16, at 261; Condominium Rider, FNMA/FHLMC, UNIFORM
INsgRumENT 6/75; Grosser, Making the Loan Commitment, in CoMMuNrry ASS'N INSTrTUTE, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS, Fmrsr NAT'L CONFERENCE ON COMMUNITY ASS'NS

66 (1976).
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Both fed-

erally-chartered and state-chartered institutions are generally permitted
to treat them as the equivalent of single-family houses, 7 although the
lending powers of state-chartered institutions are a matter of state law

and some variations exist. 8
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures permanent
mortgages on condominium units under the same general terms and

conditions as mortgages on detached houses, but if the project has more
than eleven units, insurance on permanent mortgages is available only

if the project has previously been covered by an FHA-insured project
mortgage.8 9 Thus large numbers of projects are ineligible because
they were constructed with conventional financing.

The Veterans's Administration (VA) was first given authority to
guarantee loans on condominium units in 1970, but could do so only
when at least one unit in the project had been insured by FHA.1° In
1975 this statutory limitation was dropped, and the VA now guarantees
such loans regardless of prior FHA involvement. 91 VA imposes a

number of requirements to protect its interests,

2

including the escrow-

ing of earnest money deposits by developers, a seventy percent presale

requirement (which may be reduced to fifty-one percent in special circumstances), and limitations on reservations of rights by developers
(such as the leasing of common areas to the association and the re-

tention of a veto over the association after unit owners obtain majority
control). In addition, VA regards projects as unacceptable if they pro-

hibit leasing of units for six months or more, or impose a right of first
87. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 7.2195 (1977) (Ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency: condominiums treated as real estate for lending by national banks); 12 C.F.R.
§ 541.10 (1977) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board definition of "single-family dwelling" includes condominium units for purposes of lending by federal savings and loan
associations).
88. Many state statutes dealing with institutional lending powers make no reference
to condominiums, apparently relying instead on their respective condominium acts to
establish that condominium units are to be treated as other dwellings. Some statutes
deal specifically with loans on condominium units, and may establish somewhat different lending criteria than apply to detached houses. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 7153.1
(West Supp. 1977).
89. National Housing Act § 234(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1715y(c) (Supp. V 1977); 24
C.F.R. § 234.26(a) (1977).
90. Veterans Housing Act of 1970, § 3, 84 Stat. 1108 (current version at 38 U.S.C.
§ 1810(d) (1970)).
91. Veterans Housing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-569, § 3, 88 Stat. 1863 (adding
38 U.S.C. § 1810(a) (6) (Supp. V 1975) and repealing 38 U.S.C. § 1810(d) (1970)).
92. See Policies and Procedures, Condominium Loans Under 38 U.S.C. § 1810(A)
(6), 40 Fed. Reg. 21794 (1975).
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of the VA loan guarrefusal upon resale.93 As with FHA, the terms
94
houses.
detached
on
those
to
identical
antee are
Both the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (F-LMC) purchase
permanent mortgage loans on condominium units. If a project has
been the subject of an FHA condominium project mortgage, neither
of these secondary market agencies is further concerned with the documentation; however, if construction was conventionally financed,
FNMA and FHLMC impose a number of stringent requirements on
the documentation and on certain operational aspects of the project as
well. 95 The two agencies have similar, but not identical, requirements;
they are too numerous to be summarized here, but generally deal with
the issues and concerns discussed earlier in this section.90 FNMA will
not purchase condominium mortgages in excess of ninety percent of
the unit's value, while FHLMC will buy ninety-five percent mortgages.
The two agencies also differ in their procedures for purchase of condominium unit mortgages. FNMA must receive full information on the
project and approve it before any individual unit mortgages will be purchased; 97 an essential element of the initial submission is an attorney's
opinion verifying that the documents meet FNMA's criteria. 98 FIL
MC, by contrast, does not give prior approvals. Instead, it requires
that the originating lender submit, with the first unit loan sold to FHL
MC, a certification that the documents meet FHLMC's requirements. 9
An attorney's opinion must be obtained, but may simply be retained
in the lender's files.
An obvious concern to permanent lenders is the priority of the
mortgage loan as against the lien of the owner's association for unpaid
assessments. A large majority of the state statutes follow the FHA
Model Act in providing that the lien is subordinate to any "first mort93. The latter requirement is imposed only on condominiums established after December 31, 1976; see 41 Fed. Reg. 44039 (1976).
94. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4358 (1976).
95. Examples include the completion of common area improvements, the adequacy
of reserves for repairs and replacements, 80 percent occupancy by year-round residents,
a 70 percent pre-sale requirement (which may be reduced to 51 percent by special
approval), and a power in the association to terminate any management contract upon
90 days notice. See FHLMC, SELLERS GuIDE CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGES § 3.207;
FNMA, CONVENTIONAL SELLING CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT § 502.03.

96. See text at notes 77-80, supra; see generally Jackson, note 82 supra.
97. FNMA, CONVENTIONAL SELLING CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT § 502.03 (d).

98. See Guide Form for Attorney's Opinion (Condominium Project), FNMA Form
1037.
99. FELMC, SELLER' GUIDE CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGES § 3.207.
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gage of record"; 10 0 other statutes subordinate the lien to all mortgages. 01' Obviously, under such statutes the mortgagee or other purchaser at a foreclosure sale is not subject to any liability for the assessment delinquencies of the former mortgagor, and mortgage foreclosure
wipes out the association lien as to such amounts. 0 2 However, the real
covenant which imposes the lien continues to run with the land, and
assessments which accrue after the mortgage foreclosure do become
the liability of the foreclosure purchaser, secured by the association's
lien.
Subordination of the association's lien to the first mortgage as described above is generally thought advantageous to lenders, and FHL
MC, FNMA, FHA and VA all require it.10 3 It is clearly undesirable
from the viewpoint of the association and its other members, since they
will usually have to withstand an unusually heavy assessment to make
up the delinquency of the foreclosed unit owners' 0 4 in the long run,
a series of such incidents could endanger the solvency of the association, to the detriment of unit owners and mortgagees alike. At present,
however, the preference of mortgagees for priority seems well-established. Little thought seems to have been given to the consequences
of a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Such deeds may be construed not to
disturb subordinate liens, so the association would appear to emerge
entirely unscathed. 0 5 In a sense this is probably unfortunate, since it
serves as an incentive for the lender to employ foreclosure, a decision
which is usually more costly and time-consuming for all parties.
In an effort to avoid assessment defaults, some permanent mortgage lenders require their mortgagors to pay their assessments into an
impound, reserve, or escrow account similar to those customarily maintained for taxes and insurance; the lender then remits the sums collected to the association on a regular basis. Many lenders are unenthusiastic about this technique, however, since it involves much more
100. FHA MODEL ACT § 23(a), supra note 2; VA. CODE § 55-79.84 (Supp. 1977)
(first mortgages "securing institutional lenders").
101. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-20 (1950); Brask v. Bank of St. Louis,
533 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. App. 1976).
102. FHA MODEL ACT § 23(b), supranote 2.
103. FHLMC, SELLERS' GUIDE CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGES § 3.207(c); FNMA, CoNVENTIONAL SELLING CONrACT SUPPLEMMNT § 502.03(b) (2) (b); Veterans Administration, Policies and Procedures, Condominium Loans, 40 C.F.R. 21794, § 5(c); FHA
MASTER DEED, Form No. 3276, § 19, HUD HANDBOOK 4265.1, App. 8.
104. The FHA MODEL ACT § 23(b), supra note 2, specifically authorizes the charging of such deficiencies against all unit owners, but the language is probably unnecessary.
105. See Note, 31 Mo. L. REv. 312 (1966) (discussing priority of deeds in lieu). Cf.
Alden Hotel Co. v. Kanin, 88 Misc. 2d 546, 387 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. 1976).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977

33

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 13 [1977], Iss. 1, Art. 6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:15

frequent payouts than are necessary for tax and insurance funds, and
since the assessment lien, unlike taxes and assessments, is usually subordinate to the mortgage. Nonetheless, collection of assessments by
the lender is generally a useful and desirable means of discouraging
delinquencies and stabilizing the association's cash flow.
VI.

PERMANENT FINANCING OF COOPERATIVE UNITS

Traditionally the only permanent financing involving a cooperative
project was its blanket mortgage. In most respects lenders have
viewed blanket mortgages as similar to loans on rental apartment buildings, although they have been concerned to some extent with the governance, internal procedures, and financial stability of cooperative corporations. Permanent blanket mortgages (as well as construction
loans) on cooperative projects can be insured by FHA under section
213 of the National Housing Act. 0 6 Loan-to-value ratios may be as
high as ninety-eight percent, a feature which makes section 213 more
attractive than conventional loans, which are generally limited to eighty
percent of value. While the time and complexity of processing under
section 213 reduces its usefulness, the program has been fairly active
107
in those jurisdictions in which cooperatives are popular.
In recognition of the low foreclosure and loss experience of cooperatives, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in 1975 amended its
regulations to permit federally-chartered savings and loan associations
to make loans up to ninety-five percent of the project's value; 08 the
previous limit had been eighty percent. The regulations require completion of construction, presale of ninety percent of the value or purchase price of the units, and owner-occupancy. The cooperative itself
must maintain both general operating reserves and reserves for replacements in the same amounts as are required by the FH-A section 213
106. 12 U.S.C. § 1715e (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
107. From the initiation of the § 213 program in 1950 through 1975, project mortgages on 116,155 units were insured. The states in which use of the program was
heaviest were '(in order of decreasing use) California, New York, Florida, Arizona,
Michigan, Illinois and New Jersey. California and New York were roughly equal
in participation, and together accounted for 57 percent of the units. See U.S. DEP'T
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 1975 STATISTICAL YEARlBOOK 134 (1976).

Par-

ticipation has generally dropped off sharply in recent years.
108. 40 Fed. Reg. 44,125 (1975) (codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6-1(b)(1)(iii),
545.6-7(b) (1977). Note, however, that this regulation has nothing to say about loans
on the security of individual co-op units, which the FHLBB General Counsel has ruled
are not loans secured by first liens and therefore are generally ineligible as investments
by federal savings associations; FHLBB OPINION, June 10, 1976, reported in 10
F.H.L.B.B. J. 37 (No. 6, 1977).
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program, 109 and if the loan-to-value ratio exceeds ninety percent, either
private mortgage insurance or a specific reserve fund maintained by
the lender is required. 1 '
Until recently, permanent institutional financing of individual cooperative units was unavailable; subsequent purchasers of the units
either paid cash, obtained personal loans from external sources, or gave
promissory notes to unit sellers to cover the non-cash portion of the
purchase price. However, at least two states, New York"' and Illinois, 12 now expressly authorize financial institutions to make loans on
the security of individual cooperative units. In the absence of such legislation, the authority to do so would be dubious in most jurisdictions,
since the security is a pledge of the borrower's shares of stock and an
assignment of his proprietary lease, and hence is not clearly a real
estate loan."13 The New York statutes were first enacted in 1971, and
have undergone a series of liberalizing amendments."' In their original form, they placed severe limits on the permissible maturity and
loan-to-value ratio, but both of these terms are now permitted to be
as generous as on loans made to owner-occupants of single-family
homes. The interest rate on cooperative loans is allowed to exceed
that established by the usury statute for home loans by one and onehalf percent, presumably as an incentive to lenders to enter this relatively untested field. In addition, when a loan is made to finance the
sale of a cooperative unit, the sale price is deemed to be the appraised
value for purposes of computing the loan-to-value ratio; thus, an even
larger loan might be made on a cooperative unit than a house of similar
actual value.
Institutional financing of individual cooperative units was given
further impetus by section 4(b) of the Emergency Home Purchase Act
109. See 24 C.F.R. § 213.30 (1977).
110. This fund is in addition to the reserves maintained by the cooperative itself,
and must equal 1 percent of the outstanding principal balance of the blanket mortgage.
This provision also applies to loans exceeding 90 percent of value on detached houses,
but is little used in such cases because of the wide availability of private mortgage
insurance. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-1 (a) (5) (1977).

111. N.Y. BANKING IAW §§ 103(5) (banks), 235(8-a) (savings banks), 380(2-a)
(savings and loan associations) (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
112. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 791(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
113. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Evans, No. 75-C-1947 (E.D.N.Y. April 14,
1976), summarized in 4 CoNDoMINum REPORT 6 (No. 6, July 1976), holding tht
security interest in a cooperative stock and lease to be personal property and properly
foreclosed under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
114. See Goldstein, Institutional Purchase Money Financing of Cooperative Apartinents, 46 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 632 (1972).
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of 1974, which added a new subsection (n) to Section 203 of the National Housing Act.115 It authorized FHA to insure individual unit
loans in buildings subject to a blanket mortgage insured under section
213. Under FHA's regulations the loan must be secured by a first
lien on the corporate stock certificate and the occupancy certificate
or proprietary lease." 6 The loan maturity is limited to twenty years,
and the loan may not exceed the difference between the FHA appraisal value of the unit and the unit's share of the blanket mortgage.
Thus, the regulations recognize that a unit purchaser is always taking,
in effect, subject to the blanket mortgage.
The proper method of foreclosure of a lender's security interest
in the stock and lease which represent a cooperative unit is still uncertain in most jurisdictions. In Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
v. Evans,"11 the court concluded that the lender held a security interest
in personal property which could be properly foreclosed by private sale
under section 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court rejected the cooperative member's argument that such a sale violated due
process if not preceded by a hearing, a conclusion consistent with most
decisions on the validity of power-of-sale foreclosures of real estate
mortgages."" But the applicability of the U.C.C. is by no means clear,
and the amibiguity is disturbing to many lenders. A statutory foreclosure procedure is needed in those states in which cooperatives are
used extensively.
It is possible that the efforts of FHA, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, and the state legislatures will make cooperatives more
popular than heretofore. However, neither VA nor the two quasi-federal secondary market entities, FNMA and FHLMC, have programs to
insure or purchase cooperative unit loans. In most areas of the nation
condominiums are better understood, and their financing can be
handled with only minor modifications of standard real estate security
instruments. Moreover, the problems with which lenders have become
115. 12 U.S.C. § 1709(n) (Supp. V 1975).
116. 42 Fed. Reg. 40,430 (1977) (to be codified in 24 C.F.R. § 203.43c). Neither
the statute nor the regulations explain precisely what documentation will be necessary
to establish a first lien on the unit ownership; this issue is left to state law, although
there are few if any state decisions on the point. Even New York law is unclear
as to whether U.C.C. or real estate recording is appropriate to perfect the lien; see
P. RoH N &M. RESKiN, COOPERATIVE HousiNO LAW & PRAc'rlcH § 2.01(5) (1975).
117. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Evans, No. 75-C-1947 (E.D.N.Y. April 14, 1976).
118. See Note, 41 Mo.L. RaV. 278 (1976).
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increasingly concerned in condominium unit financing, such as developer control and contributions, adequacy of reserves, the impact of
rights of approval and first refusal, and the soundness of the association's major policy decisions, are all equally relevant in cooperative unit
financing. From the financing viewpoint, cooperatives thus have no
advantages and several disadvantages over condominiums. Hence,
condominiums will probably continue to eclipse cooperatives as the preferred means of unit ownership.
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